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Tentative Recommendations for Reorganization of SRS

The future of SRS may be considered under two alternatives to the status quo or the Inspector General's recommendation.

I. A merger of SRS and [REDACTED] (plus selected other elements of DD/P and DD/I) to establish an independent office under the DCI. The idea of a unified research office on International Communism (including OIR), was proposed as far back as 1954 by [REDACTED] and in an even broader form has also been advocated by Mr. Angleton. Its primary advantage would be the incorporation of all major elements of the Agency dealing with International Communism into a single group, jurisdictionally freed from either the operational or the intelligence hierarchies, and thus able to serve them both impartially. Such a group would also afford a suitable mechanism of cooperation with other IAC elements, and would serve the requirements of the entire intelligence community. The principal difficulty is of a practical order. The establishment of an Office of International Communism would involve major organizational readjustment, uprooting an element of DD/P which serves a wide variety of essential purposes for the operational desks and field stations.

Presumably DD/P would insist upon retaining a substantial element to

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continue the operational support function, leaving an unresolved problem of jurisdictional overlap with the newly created Office.

II. Maintenance of the present dual arrangement, while transferring the Senior Research Staff to the Office of the Director.

On balance we believe that this is the most satisfactory solution of the International Communism problem. Specifically, we would recommend that SRS be transferred as presently organized, while bringing it up to the strength originally recommended by [REDACTED] i.e. adding three or four research assistants.

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A. Advantages

1. A strengthened Senior Research Staff in the Office of the Director would be able to carry out all the functions originally conceived for it by [REDACTED] some of which have proved difficult of fulfillment under the de facto assignment to the office of the DD/I. (It should be stressed that these difficulties did not arise through any fault of SRS or of DD/I, but from the obstacles created by the organizational and physical separation of the two major components of the Agency).

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2. The speculative function would be elevated to the highest level of the Intelligence Community, as [REDACTED] had recommended. The product of this speculation, which is carefully distinguished from

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the broad estimative and coordination function of ONE, would, through the Director, have ready circulation in the policy echelons of the government.

3. The task of viewing International Communism "through Sino-Soviet eyes," which is not assigned elsewhere in the Agency, could be carried out with the necessary detachment and freedom of imagination. At present, there is a certain tendency to minimize the importance of this approach or to view its results with misgiving.

4. A firm bridge would be established between operations and intelligence research in the International Communist field. Despite general cooperation at working levels, there is some tendency within DD/P to resent or resist suggestions from a DD/I element. Conversely, it has been difficult for SRS to obtain the general information on operations which is often necessary if its speculations and suggestions are to be useful.

5. Assignment to the office of the Director would strengthen the role of SRS in the Intelligence Community, leading to the possibility of reinvigorating the moribund International Communism Subcommittee of the IAC.

6. A firm link would be created between the higher levels of academic or non-government research and the Intelligence Community. SRS has made considerable progress in this direction, and the DD/I

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assignment has not impeded this endeavor. Nevertheless, the task would be easier from the vantage point of the Director's office.

B. Disadvantages

1. An additional administrative burden would be imposed on the Director's personal office. We do not believe this would be substantial, since the administrative requirements of SRS are slight and could be handled by its own administrative assistant working directly with DD/S.

2. There may continue to be some resentment against a group with the functions assigned to it under the [REDACTED] concept, and this would not automatically be eliminated by assignment to the highest level of the Agency. This is an intangible which cannot be ignored, but, in our opinion, with appropriate support and guidance, SRS can, by tact and helpful activity, establish relations of esteem, harmony and cooperation at all levels of the Agency with which it deals.

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In sum, we believe that under the Director's authority, SRS would be able to continue and improve the speculative research which has been its principal function during the past thirty months, and could maintain itself as a unique and valuable part of the Agency.

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